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-e requirement for eﬃcient public spending leads contracting authorities to use electronic reverse auctions (e-RA), a tool that
allows achieving ﬁnancial savings. In this study, we aim to explore the relationships between the diﬀerent acting e-RA variables
and to check for predictive models in order to infer on the savings amount in construction public procurement. Data on real
construction auctions in Slovakia were statistically analysed by means of graphics tools, multiple regression analysis, test, and
statistics for measuring the association between categorical variables.-e results revealed that one should take the type of contract
into account when considering the use of e-RA.-is research provides several implications for purchasing practitioners in the area
of construction procurement, especially with regard to the level of competition in the auction and estimation of savings potential.
Presented ﬁndings aid managerial decision-making process of e-RA adoption. At the end, recommended future research di-
rections in the investigated area are outlined.
1. Introduction
Construction projects typically have a high degree of
complexity, they are diﬃcult to manage [1], and they are
characterized by the high number of stakeholders involved.
-erefore, proper attention should be paid to all particular
project phases and the individual activities carried out
during them. -is paper focuses on one particular project
phase, that of procurement, which is extremely important
from the client’s perspective, because selecting a capable
contractor increases the probability that the main project
goals [2, 3]—cost, time, and quality—will be achieved.
However, time [4] and cost overruns are common for
construction projects and often the former is followed by the
latter [5, 6]. Furthermore, due to the long-term nature of
construction activity, changes in the price of materials and
costs can be expected and should be taken into account in
tender documentation because it is important for the in-
vestor to know the ﬁnal cost of the investment [7].
Construction transactions can be even more risky than
others due to their speciﬁc nature: it is quite often the case
that the partners (client and contractor) do not know each
other [8] and that the relationship between them is on a one-
time and short-term basis, especially in the area of public
procurement.
During the procurement phase, clients should prepare
the tender documentation, invite prospective contractors to
submit their bids, check the compliance with the qualiﬁ-
cation prerequisites, evaluate the bids submitted, and award
the contract to the winning supplier. Eﬀective negotiation on
price as well as other evaluation criteria is important in order
to ensure that the client gets the best value for money. For
this reason, supporting electronic reverse auctions (e-RA)
should be considered. In public procurement, according to
the Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement [9], buyers
(i.e., contracting authorities) may use electronic auctions.
Positive outcomes of construction projects, no matter
whether they are supported by e-RA or not, can be expected
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only if the necessary requirement of detailed preparation is
met. From this perspective, decision-support systems are
very helpful [10] and e-RA can be considered as playing a
supporting role in achieving project eﬀectiveness and
eﬃciency.
In this study, data on real construction auctions are
processed. In this context, construction tenders are un-
derstood as tenders that generally relate to the construction
sector, i.e., the execution of construction works, delivery of
services relating to construction such as maintenance or
inspection, delivery of project documentation, and so on.
1.1. ProblemStatement, Objectives, and Structure of the Paper.
It is clear from the literature that there is little quantitative
knowledge on the modelling of the relative savings variable.
At the same time, however, it is strongly convenient for the
clients to have an idea about the amount of the expected
relative savings derived from the bidding competition. -is
paper’s main objective and research contribution is to ad-
dress this problem with a predictive perspective by exam-
ining the relationships between the diﬀerent variables acting
in e-RA in the framework of public procurement in Slovakia,
as well as by establishing predictive models to infer the
amount of savings. To achieve this general aim and to
overcome the problem, we will structure the paper according
to four speciﬁc objectives: (a) to evaluate whether the type of
tender is associated with the number of bidders, i.e., with the
competitiveness possibilities, (b) to measure the dependency
structure among the acting variables, (c) to select predictive
variables and the corresponding statistical model for the
amount of relative savings, and (d) to estimate the pro-
portion of tenders using the lowest bid price as an evaluation
method in the auction, in comparison with other countries
in the same geographical area.
-e paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides
background relating to e-RA and focuses on related drivers
and barriers with regard to construction tenders. Section 3
presents the motivating dataset that will be used across the
work.-emain statistical research and ﬁndings based on the
evaluation of quantitative data and related discussion on the
results are provided in Section 4. -e ﬁnal section presents
the main conclusions and research implications, addresses
limitations of the research, and outlines future research
directions in the corresponding ﬁeld of study.
2. State of the Art
Clients are motivated to adopt e-RA as they are associated
mainly with ﬁnancial savings [11] and enhanced trans-
parency of the purchasing process [12].-e high signiﬁcance
of these two beneﬁts is conﬁrmed e.g., by an empirical study
analysing e-RA users’ attitudes in the Czech Republic and
Slovakia [13]. Despite the fact that e-RA provide several
beneﬁts, the overall rate of adoption is very small, as
documented e.g., through the example of Portugal [14].
Although the ﬁrst-mentioned beneﬁt, ﬁnancial savings, is
reﬂected only on the side of clients, increased transparency
makes e-RA desirable for contractors as well. Muylle and
Standaert [15] revealed that use of procedural fairness in
e-RA is positively related to relationship quality. Financial
savings can be expected if a suﬃcient level of competition
exists in the tender [16]. A number of studies have assessed
the conditions of competition using various indicators,
e.g., concentration and inequality [17]. Ye et al. [18] deﬁne
the project level competition intensity measurement as the
extent to which competition happens in a pool of contractors
who are bidding for common construction works. Wu and
Kersten [19] found out that more eﬃcient and balanced
contracts between a buyer and a supplier can be better
reached by negotiations than auctions. An interesting
ﬁnding on the interaction between competition and cor-
ruption has been brought by Celentani and Ganuza [20].
-ey emphasised that more competition may imply higher
corruption in certain markets; however, that does not
necessarily imply that more competition is undesirable.
From the perspective of e-RA, the level of competition is
reﬂected by the number of suppliers who have submitted
their bids. It is usually assumed that four contractors par-
ticipating in an auction already create the conditions for a
successful ﬁnancial outcome of the auction [21].-e number
of bidders is dependent on various factors, not just on the
expected value of the contract. Simulation of Schmidt [22]
based on game theory has proved that higher transaction
costs (such as study of project documentation or bid pro-
cessing) cause a lower number of bids submitted. Costs of
placing the bid cannot be omitted especially in the case of
complicated procurement auctions [23].
It is worth noting that the spectrum of construction
tenders is very wide (schools, buildings, roads, water/sewage
systems, etc.) and together with diﬀerent market conditions,
these diﬀerences may aﬀect the amount of competition
among contractors. -e interaction of supply and demand
and the eﬀect of business cycles (economic crises vs. periods
of prosperity) aﬀect the amount of contractors’ markups
[24] as well as the amount of ﬁnancial savings achieved by
clients. Buyers in construction industry can use the level of
construction demand as an indicator for timing the tender
call [25]. On the example of the Czech Republic, it has been
shown that the amount of relative savings achieved in
tenders for the performance of works on schools is more
dependent on the type of the tender when compared, e.g., to
transport infrastructure tenders [26]. -erefore, the type of
construction contract may also signiﬁcantly aﬀect e-RA
outcomes.
-e implementation of e-RA in construction is hindered
by the fact that some contractors are not willing to par-
ticipate in such auctions [27]. -e problem does not involve
only e-RA; the construction industry is known for late
adoption of IT in general. For example, the study of Zunk
et al. [28] has shown that rates of e-procurement adoption in
the Austrian construction industry are low and that a sig-
niﬁcant part of respondents have poor knowledge about
e-procurement. -erefore, clients have to seek an optimal
balance between the qualiﬁcation prerequisites and number
of participating contractors. More speciﬁcally, it is crucial to
ensure that only capable contractors submit bids, but at the
same time, the qualiﬁcation prerequisites cannot be so strict
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as to hinder participation of a suﬃcient number of bidders to
facilitate eﬀective price negotiation in e-RA. In this relation,
Tka´cˇ et al. [29] have published a study showing 12 reasons
why construction companies decline to prepare a proposal
for their potential clients, and Les´niak and Plebankiewicz
[30] have identiﬁed (1) type of the work, (2) experience in
similar project, and (3) contractual terms to be the top three
most vital factors inﬂuencing the bid/no bid decision of
contractors. Taking this into account, it is important to
estimate individual bidder participation correctly [31].
It is also important to mention that e-RA are not suitable
for all types of works. In this context, Directive 2014/24/EU
on public procurement [9] in Article 35 notes that “Certain
public service contracts and certain public works contracts
having as their subject-matter intellectual performances,
such as the design of works, which cannot be ranked using
automatic evaluation methods, shall not be the object of
electronic auctions.”
From an ethical perspective, e-RA may also lead to the
submission of abnormally low bids [32] as well as delivery of
poor-quality products and services. In this relation, Ahmed
et al. [33] have used a game theory approach to demonstrate
that the majority of contractors suﬀer from the winner’s
curse (i.e., winning bidder who have submitted the
underestimated bid is selected to perform the project) in
diﬀerent bidding environments. It is diﬃcult for clients to
detect abnormally low bid prices as there is no universal
deﬁnition of abnormality [34]. Diﬀerent mathematical ap-
proaches are used in individual countries, and in some
countries, the deﬁnition is so vague that no formula is
prescribed. -e most common systems to detect abnormally
in low bid price are arithmetic systems measuring the de-
viation of a particular bid from the average of all bids
submitted [35].-erefore, speciﬁc actions should be taken in
this area in order to facilitate the process and detect ab-
normally low bids [36]. Auctions are also prone to other
types of unethical behaviours such as a collusion of suppliers
[37, 38] or awarding contracts more often to incumbents
[39]. -e academic literature also notes the problem of a
potential drop in quality. Love and Li [40] claim that poor-
quality delivery has become an endemic trait of public sector
procurement in construction. A detailed description of the
required quality followed by adequate prequaliﬁcation of
contractors therefore represents a crucial condition for
successful implementation of e-RA [41]. Furthermore, a
suﬃcient level of detail and speciﬁcations prevent the oc-
currence of construction delays, adding to the need for high-
quality documentation [42]. It should also be noted that
unclear tender documents may result in queries, clariﬁca-
tions, or even not submitting a bid at all [43].
Quality e-RA systems support the evaluation of bids by
using multicriteria. Despite the fact that awarding the
contract on the basis of the lowest bid price is preferred in
certain countries, such as the Czech Republic and Poland [44],
the most economically advantageous tender can also be
supported by e-RA. Ballesteros et al. [35] concluded that
reaching the best combination between economic score
formulas and abnormally low bid criteria is a challenge and
requires further research. For structures, the investor should
take into account life-cycle costs [45], i.e., not only costs of the
construction works themselves, but also the future operation,
maintenance, and demolition costs that aﬀect the eﬀectiveness
of any investment [46]. With respect to legal conditions,
environmental criteria can also be considered, as applicable,
e.g., for transport infrastructure projects [47]. Beyond those
yet listed, other meaningful criteria may be applied, such as
the duration of construction works (important in the event
that they restricts or interrupts operation, e.g., in hospitals and
schools) or the duration of warranty. Application of multiply
awarding factors such as price and time is also desirable for
transport infrastructure projects. For example, Lewis and
Bajari [48] proposed a model for giving incentives to con-
tractors to earlier project completion with the aim to reduce
costly commuter delays. Using quality as the evaluation
criterion is questionable since construction contracts often do
not enable variable quality of performance when the indi-
vidual materials and technological procedures are pre-
determined. Generally, it is necessary to pay proper attention
to choosing the right method of awarding public tenders, as
recommended in [49].
Recent study on e-RA [50] has revealed that the use of
auctions in construction procurement should also be con-
sidered from the perspective of postauction eﬀects within the
whole construction project life cycle such as operation and
maintenance costs, supervision on the site, or amount/value
of additional works. In this relation, engagement of facilities
management in the design stage through BIM represents a
good presumption for eﬀective monitoring of the building/
structure during and after its completion [51].
According to authors’ knowledge, studies on the analysis
of the interaction between variables such as number of
bidders, best bid before auction, number of changes, and
achieved relative saving with a predictive focus have not
been conducted yet. Research into this modelling approach
is needed in order to estimate the eﬀect of the bidding
variables on the resulting saving amounts and to design
proper strategies. -is is the knowledge gap that this paper
aims to overcome.
3. Slovak e-RA Motivating Dataset
3.1. Description of Study Area and Current e-RA Regulations.
Slovakia is a small country that has experienced trans-
formation of the economy after 1989 and became an in-
dependent country in 1993. In 2016, the volume of
construction public tenders announced was approximately
1,948 million EUR corresponding to the number of 2,930
contracts [52]. Share of construction in total GDP was es-
timated at 7.1% in 2016 [53] and generally growing trend in
construction is documented, e.g., by increasing capacity
utilization of companies [52]. Basic data on the area under
study are presented in Table 1.
In Slovakia, the legislation governing public pro-
curement has been very progressive from an e-RA per-
spective. From as early as 2011, it has been compulsory to use
e-RA for above-threshold and below-threshold public tenders
[55]. However, in relation to public works tenders, the Oﬃce
for Public Procurement [56] decided that the use of auctions
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is mandatory only when it is possible to specify the technical
requirements relating to the subject matter, while in other cases,
there is no obligation. -e Oﬃce justiﬁed the abovementioned
decision by concerns of lowering prices at the expense of quality
and the ability of the tender winners to complete the projects
according to speciﬁcations. -ere were concerns about the
quality with regard to services as well. Since 2014, the re-
quirement to use e-RA has been limited only to the supply of
goods that are commonly available on the market (Slovak
Republic, Act no. 25/2006 Coll., as amended on 27.2.2014 [57]).
3.2. Dataset on Construction Auctions. For the purpose of
this study, data on e-RA were provided by one of the leading
e-RA system operators in Slovakia. In order to protect the
conﬁdentiality of the data, the dataset was provided ano-
nymized, i.e., it was not possible to ascertain a name of
buyer, but it was possible to determine the subject of the
purchase. -e data represent information on real completed
e-RA public tenders relating to construction procurement in
Slovakia within 2013–2016 period. A price-setting mecha-
nism for these auctions is a ﬁrst-price auction, i.e., what you
bid is what you pay. For these e-RA, the bidding round is
automatically prolonged if any of the suppliers bids shortly
before its end (such measure gives other suppliers enough
time to respond to this last bid). A total of 170 records were
obtained for the purpose of this research. For each e-RA
record, it was required that the following detailed in-
formation be available: name of the tender, number of
applicants who registered in the particular auction, number
of applicants who submitted bids (i.e., the number of bid-
ders), expected value of the contract in EUR, best bid before
the competition round of the auction in EUR (BBA),
winning bid after auction in EUR (i.e., award price, AWP),
number of bid changes during the auction, and type of
evaluation method used. To evaluate the amount of achieved
relative savings (ARSs), the following equation was used:
ARS � 1−AWP
BBA
( ) × 100, (1)
where BBA represents the value of the best bid price (i.e., the
bid with the lowest price) that was submitted by suppliers
before the competition round of the auction. Such bids can
also be called “initial bids.” Each supplier is obliged to
submit a complete bid in advance of the competition round.
-e buyer checks whether the bids are complete and if
qualiﬁcation prerequisites are fulﬁlled.
4. Analysis, Results, and Discussion
4.1. Introduction and Acting Variables. To tackle with the
objectives of the paper introduced in Section 1, the moti-
vating dataset in the previous section was statistically
analysed. For the computational methodologies, the sta-
tistical software Minitab, release 17 [58], was used. -e
speciﬁc statistical tools and methods, like histograms,
scatterplots, correlation analysis, multiple regression
analysis, chi-square test of independence, and statistics for
measuring the association between categorical variables as
well as statistics for examining relationships between se-
lected e-RA variables can be found in the study of
Montgomery and Runger [59].
In order to allow a more detailed investigation, the
records were categorized according to the type and usual
nature of the public tender, by deﬁning a type of contract
variable (TOC). -e following four categories were de-
termined: buildings (BUI, e.g., repairs, replacement of
windows, and performing additional thermal insulation),
communications (COM, e.g., roads, parking places, and
pavements), construction projects and maintenance (PRM,
e.g., project documentation, energy audit, cleaning of sewer
shafts, and maintenance of the cooling system), and “other”
(OTH) category of tenders that did not belong to any of the
aforementioned categories. A summary of the variables is
presented in Table 2.
4.2. Preprocessing and Final Dataset. In order to avoid a
potential bias on the inferences and conclusions due to the
presence of outliers in the dataset, we proceed to remove
those records that were outliers in a minimum of two
variables. Records were identiﬁed as an outlier by using the
boxplot-and-whiskers technique. Two debugging steps were
needed. Seven records were identiﬁed in the ﬁrst debug and
two in the second one. As a result, the ﬁnal debugged sample,
for further processing analyses in this research, was made of
161 e-RA records.
4.3. Descriptive Analysis of the Sample. Sample size of the
collected dataset is 161, and data correspond to records
(statistical subjects) on real individual tenders relating to the
construction supported by e-RA. Table 3 displays the dis-
tribution and percentages of the sample in each category
according to the type of the contract and the type of the
evaluation method used by the tender. We can observe that
the most common type of public contracts were BUI, this
category represents 43.5% of the sample, followed by 22.4%,
20.5%, and 13.6% for COM, PRM, and OTH, respectively. It
is also obvious that the majority of the tenders use the lowest
bid price as an evaluation method for solving the auction.
When computing the two-ways table of contingency
TOC-TEM, despite the few number of records with TEM �
multicriteria, a diﬀerent distribution pattern of TOC is
noticeable within this category, in the sense that the majority
of the contracts correspond to OTH, diﬀerent from BUI in
the global sample and also in the TEM � lowest bid price
subsample. -is result sounds natural when we consider the
Table 1: Characteristics of study area.
Indicator Value
Population (2017)∗ 5,441,899
GDP growth (2016)∗ 3.3%
Unemployment (2016)∗ 9.7%
Inﬂation rate (Q4/2016)∗ −0.1%
Average nominal month wage (2016)∗ 912 EUR
Volume of construction public
tenders announced (2016)∗∗ 1,948millionEUR∗Statistical Oﬃce of the Slovak Republic, oﬃcial website [54]; ∗∗CEEC
Research [52].
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variety of projects included in the category OTH, which may
require diﬀerent evaluation methods than the lowest price.
Concerning quantitative variables NOB, BBA, CHA, and
ARS, the respective mean proﬁle is shown by auctions with
3–4 (3.74) bidders, with a best bid price before auction about
30,000€ (30,015€), that after experimenting about 40
changes during the auction, 42.8 gets relatives saving about
14.0%. However, the distribution of the data in each one of
these variable is really asymmetric. Figure 1 illustrates dif-
ferent graphical outputs for these distributions. It is in-
teresting to note (a) the distribution of number of bidders is
clearly unimodal, with mode equal to 3; however, the dis-
tribution is diﬀerent across the categories of types of con-
tract, (b) despite the debugging outliers’ process, variables
best bid before auction and number of changes during the
auction present a long right tail with potential inﬂuencing
data, and (c) variables of number of changes and achieved
relative savings are zero-inﬂated in the sense of containing
structural zeros corresponding (in part) to those records
with the number of bidders equal to 1 that makes not
necessary neither introducing changes nor reducing the
initial bidding price (in particular, 54.6% of the auctions
with no changes and 31.0% of the auctions with no savings
correspond to auctions with a single bidder, i.e., with no
competition).
4.4. Competition in Construction Auctions. As it is argued
that strong competition is a necessary condition for
achieving the favourable e-RA output in terms of ﬁnancial
savings, it was analysed to what extent the condition of
minimal participation of four bidders is satisﬁed, as rec-
ommended in [21]. In order to test for the association be-
tween the diﬀerent types of contract and the fulﬁlment of
more than three bidders, we conducted a chi-square test and
we obtained the results in Table 4.
-e χ2 test of independence takes value 8.783 under 3
degrees of freedom χ2 distribution, what means a p value of
0.032. So, under a 0.05 level of signiﬁcance, we proved that
there is an association among these two variables, because
diﬀerences in distribution are enough to reject the null
hypothesis on the independence of the examined categorical
variables. -is conclusion is also graphically supported by
the conditional bar chart plotted in Figure 2(a).
In a complementary manner, a histogram depicting the
detailed distribution of the number of bidders in tenders in
the BUI, COM, OTH, and PRM categories is shown in
Figure 2(b). It is clearly visible that, for the OTH and PRM
categories, almost half of the examined tenders reported 3
bidders as maximum, which is slightly below the recom-
mended limit. -e maximum reported number of bidders
for these categories was only 6. In contrast to this, both BUI
and COM categories reported tenders with more than 6
bidders, while on the contrary, a considerable amount of
tenders in the BUI category (12.9%) reported a single bidder.
-is represents a very unfavourable situation because the
element of competition is not present at all. Furthermore, it
can be expected that, in e-RA, many contractors will initially
submit a higher bid price in order to create space for further
bid price reduction during the comparison round. As a
consequence, it may happen that the award price achieved
through e-RA will be higher compared to traditional pro-
curement when only one bid is submitted.
4.5. Analysis of Relationships between e-RA Variables.
Relationships between selected e-RA variables were examined
by using matricial scatterplots and correlation analysis. -ese
variables contain the following: the number of bidders (NOB),
best bid before auction (BBA), number of changes of bids
during comparison round (CHA), and the amount of
achieved relative savings (ARSs). -e variables NOB and
CHA indicate competition in the auction; BBA represents the
attractiveness of the contract in terms of its ﬁnancial volume,
and ARS indicates the most important auction outcome.
In order to explore the potential relationships between
each pair of variables, without ﬁtting a speciﬁc model—such
as a regression line or a theoretical distribution—and to
reduce the impact of inﬂuencing observations, we plotted
the data together with the locally weighted scatterplot
smoother—from here on lowess–Cleveland [60] proﬁle. -e
resulting graphs are depicted in Figure 3. Despite the
smoothing strategy, we can observe the impact of the outliers
in the resulting estimated lowess proﬁles (in particular when
the output variable is the achieved amount of savings) and
that a clear shape for the estimation model does not exist.
Table 2: Characteristics (name, description, type, and values) of the variables in the construction auctions dataset.
Name Description Type Values/range
ID Identiﬁcation code Textual 1–170
TOC Type of contract Categorical BUI, COM, OTH, PRM
TEM Type of evaluation method Categorical Lowest bid price, multicriteria
NOB Number of bidders Ordinal 1–9
BBA Best bid before auction Continuous 31–634,000€
CHA Number of changes during the auction Ordinal 0–1,251
ARS Achieved relative saving Continuous 0.0–67.8%
Table 3: Frequency tables for the categorical variables TOC (type of
contract) and TEM (type of evaluation method).
Variable Category Number of e-RA (%)
TOC
BUI 70 (43.5)
COM 36 (22.4)
OTH 22 (13.6)
PRM 33 (20.5)
TEM Lowest bid price 149 (92.5)Multicriteria 12 (7.5)
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When estimating Pearson’s correlation coeﬃcient ma-
trices for the variables NOB, BBA, CHA, and ARS according
to Evans [61], denoted by R for the global dataset and BUI,
COM, OTH, and PRM when we stratify within the diﬀerent
types of contract, we obtained the following results:
R �
1 0.042 0.225∗ 0.262∗
0.042 1 −0.003 −0.073
0.225∗ −0.003 1 0.232∗
0.262∗ −0.073 0.232∗ 1


,
RBUI �
1 0.124 0.240∗ 0.291∗
0.124 1 0.073 0.066
0.240∗ 0.073 1 0.471∗
0.291∗ 0.066 0.471∗ 1


,
RCOM �
1 0.070 0.262 0.526∗
0.070 1 −0.015 −0.064
0.262 −0.015 1 0.186
0.526∗ −0.064 0.186 1


,
ROTH �
1 −0.137 0.259 −0.164−0.137 1 −0.199 −0.178
0.259 −0.199 1 0.159−0.164 −0.178 0.159 1


,
RPRM �
1 −0.073 0.426∗ 0.295−0.073 1 −0.070 −0.093
0.426∗ −0.070 1 0.284
0.295 −0.093 0.284 1


,
(2)
where values with ∗ denote a linear correlation coeﬃcient
statistically diﬀerent from 0 at α � 0.05 signiﬁcance level.
-e results reveal just weak (r in 0.20–0.39) positive
correlations for the global dataset: NOB-CHA, NOB-ARS,
and CHA-ARS. At this level, therefore, it is not possible to
speak about important relationships between variables.
However, when looking at stratiﬁed data according to the
TOC, more interesting relationships are emerging. For BUI,
there is moderate positive correlation (0.471) between CHA
and ARS. For COM, the strongest relation exists between
NOB and ARS (0.526). For OTH, just weak or very weak
correlations were identiﬁed, and in PRM category, one
moderate correlation (0.426) between NOB and CHA has
been detected.
-ese results suggest that the market conditions and
bidding strategy may diﬀer according to TOC. For BUI, the
results indicate that higher ARS is associated with strong
competition even with fewer numbers of bidders, while for
COM, the amount of ARS is more dependent on NOB, i.e., it
is less likely to expect higher savings with a lower number of
bidders. In the case of PRM, higher amount of CHA can be
achieved if the buyer is able to attract more bidders to the
auction. We attribute the appearance of just weak or very
weak relations in OTH to the great variety of tenders with
respect to their character. As no important relationship of
BBA with any other variable was detected, this suggests that
the attractiveness of the contract cannot be considered a
factor contributing to higher competition in e-RA. From
this, we can infer that small-scale contracts will not be more
frequently followed by the problem of participation of
suppliers.
4.6. Evaluation of Achieved Savings. From the previous
section we knew that, in order to predict the achieved
relative savings (ARSs), the main predictor variables are the
number of bidders (NOB) and the number of changes
during the auction (CHA). However, the variables NOB and
CHA are also correlated, and it could happen that part of the
variability in ARS may be explained simultaneously by both
with also a potential eﬀect of the interaction between both
variables. Based on this and to control for colinearity, we
estimated the best model for ARS in the family of linear
models with the covariates NOB and CHA and its in-
teraction NOB-CHA, that is,
ARS � β0 + β1 · NOB + β2 · CHA + β3 · NOB · CHA + ε,
(3)
where the error term follows a zero-mean normal distri-
bution, i.e., ε ∼ N(0, σ2).
When estimating the model in the overall dataset and the
diﬀerent categories in TOC, we realized that, in categories
OTH and PRM, neither variables NOB and CHA nor its
interaction is signiﬁcant (at α � 0.05). -is result was
consistent with the correlation matrices in those groups. A
summary of the most signiﬁcant regression models at a 95%
conﬁdence level is reported in Table 5. -e ﬁnal criterion for
accepting the model was a signiﬁcant improvement of the
R2-adjusted coeﬃcient after considering the complexity of
the resulting linear model.
From models in Table 5, we can derive that the most
impacting variable on the amount of savings is the number
of bidders. -e baseline eﬀect of one extrabidder in the
percentage of savings can be roughly estimated in 3 units in
the overall dataset, 2 units in the BUI contracts and 4 units in
the COM contracts. Less impacting is the eﬀect of the
number of changes that it can be only moving the percentage
of savings in the overall dataset and the BUI subsample. In
particular, in these datasets, the baseline beneﬁt is of 1 unit of
percentage every 4 changes, which is reduced due to the
interaction when the number of bidders and changes in-
crease in about 1 unit every bidder and 25 changes. Note
that, in the COM contracts, the covariate number of changes
is not signiﬁcant, which states that the estimation of the
amount of saving is only dependent on the number of
bidders. -e predictions we can estimate with the models in
Table 5, as well as the eﬀect of number of changes on the
amount of saving as a function of the number of bidders, are
displayed in Figure 4 by contour plots and stratiﬁed scat-
terplots for the estimation of the achieved relative savings
percentage.
-e ﬁndings resulting from Figure 4 are very interesting
because they highlight the importance of TOC in our
analysis. Firstly, it is clearly visible that the contour plots for
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the ARS prediction for the full dataset (Figure 4(a)), BUI
(Figure 4(c)) and COM (Figure 4(e)) subsamples are very
diﬀerent. Also stratiﬁed scatterplots (Figures 4(b), 4(e), and
4(f)) diﬀer from each other. In the case of the full dataset,
data indicate that, with a lower NOB (NOB � 2), it is very
important to have a high value of CHA during e-RA to
achieve higher ARS. -erefore, it is important to have in the
auction those participants who are very interested in getting
the contract. In contrast to this, with higher NOB (NOB � 8),
the increasing value of CHA does not contribute to higher
ARS achievement. In the case of the BUI subsample, the
scatterplot suggests that the lower the value of NOB is, the
more important the active competition of bidders in e-RA is
from the perspective of achieving higher ARS. Especially the
COM subsample shows a totally diﬀerent contour plot and
scatterplot for ARS prediction. Data indicate that the CHA
variable is not important at all, as the value of ARS depends
almost solely on NOB. We attribute this to the fact that a
high value of CHA in this case probably corresponds just to
very low relative bid reductions, and therefore, it is very
important for the buyer to ensure high participation of
bidders.
4.7. EvaluationMethodUsed in e-RA. Because the studies on
Czech and Polish construction tenders reported that the
overwhelming majority of them were evaluated solely on the
basis of the lowest bid price, it could be expected that the
situation is similar in Slovakia. As can be seen in Table 6,
regardless of the type of the contract, the overwhelming
majority of tenders were evaluated solely on the basis of the
lowest bid price. A χ2 test is not suﬃcient to show if the
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Figure 1: Distributions of the data for the following variables: (a) bar chart of NOB stacked by categories in TOC, (b) boxplot of BBA1, (c)
histogram of CHA2, and (d) histogram of ARS. 1Records with BBA > 100,000 (n � 8) were not depicted. 2Records with CHA > 200 (n � 4)
were not depicted.
Table 4: Contingency table for the χ2 test among the type of
contract and the dichotomized number of bidders for the con-
struction e-RA dataset.
TOC NOB ≤ 3 NOB ≥ 4 χ2 df pFrequency (row %) Frequency (row %)
BUI 33 (47.1) 37 (52.9)
8.783 3 0.032
COM 15 (41.7) 21 (58.3)
OTH 17 (77.3) 5 (22.7)
PRM 20 (60.6) 13 (39.4)
Total 85 (52.8) 76 (47.2)
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Figure 2: Descriptive plots for the construction e-RA dataset. (a) Bar chart for the conditional distribution of at least 4 bidders indicator
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Figure 3: Matrix plots with lowess smoother for the NOB, BBA, CHA, and ARS variables in the construction e-RA dataset.
Table 5: Estimated linear models for the prediction of the achieved relative savings percentage based on the number of bidders, the number
of changes, and its interaction, for the full construction e-RA auctions dataset and the BUI and COM types of contract subsets. -e models
have been chosen at a α � 0.05 global signiﬁcance level.
Variable
Overall sample BUI subsample COM subsample
Estimate (s.e.) p value Estimate (s.e.) p value Estimate (s.e.) p value
Intercept 1.21 (2.84) 0.670 2.39 (3.51) 0.498 −5.23 (5.38) 0.338
NOB 2.71 (0.67) <0.001 1.96 (0.86) 0.026 4.38 (1.21) 0.001
CHA 0.25 (0.06) <0.001 0.24 (0.10) 0.016 — —
NOB·CHA −0.04 (0.01) <0.001 −0.03 (0.02) 0.142 — —
R2 17.38% 27.95% 27.71%
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evaluation method used is dependent on the type of the
contract, in particular because the expected frequency
is lower than 5 in some cells of the contingency table.
However, statistics like Cramer’s (V2  0.070) and
Goodman-Kruskal’s lambda statistic (λTOC  0.044; λTEM <
0.001) prove that there is no a signicant association between
these two nominal variables or, in other terms, the associ-
ation seems to be weak.
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Figure 4: (a, c, e) Contour plots and (b, d, f ) stratied scatterplots for the estimation of the achieved relative savings percentage based on the
number of bidders, the number of changes, and its interaction, for the full construction e-RA auctions dataset and the BUI and COM types of
contract subsets.
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From a global perspective point of view, it has been
veriﬁed that the Slovak practice in evaluating public tenders
from the perspective of the use of lowest bid price is similar
to that of the Czech Republic and Poland [44]. -is can be
attributed to the fact that public authorities prefer simple
evaluation on the basis of the lowest bid price in order to
avoid potential objections of bidders claiming improperly
selected or nonobjective criteria. Speciﬁcally, based on the
data, the estimated proportion of e-RA auction using the
lowest bid price as an evaluation method is 92.5% (95% CI:
(87.3%, 96.1%)).
4.8. Main Findings and Discussion. -e results presented in
this paper have shown that a signiﬁcant proportion of e-RA
(52.8%) faces low number bidders (NOB ≤ 3). -is problem
is more distinct for OTH and PRM subsamples (77.3% and
60.6%, respectively), and the χ2 test of independence proved
that there is the statistically signiﬁcant association among
TOC and NOB variables. -e eﬀect of TOC has also been
revealed by the matricial scatterplots and the correlation
analysis of e-RA variables. While positive moderate corre-
lation exists between NOB and ARS in the COM subsample,
then positive moderate correlation between CHA and ARS
has been identiﬁed in the BUI subsample.
Based on the performed analysis, it can be stated that
linear models for the prediction of the ARS percentage based
on NOB, CHA, and their interaction, as well as subsequent
analysis using contour plots and stratiﬁed scatterplots, have
shown diﬀerent relationships between the variables exam-
ined among the full dataset and individual subsets (BUI and
COM).
-e results show that the diversity of construction tender
types (transport infrastructure projects, buildings, mainte-
nance, etc.) may have signiﬁcant eﬀect on e-RA outputs.-is
can be documented in relation to the recommendation of
having at least four bidders in the auction [21]. -e achieved
results therefore coincide with the literature analysis, as
similar diﬀerences in competition among diﬀerent types of
contracts are corroborated in a similar manner than in [62]
for instance.
-e results have also highlighted that ARS estimation
mainly depends on the NOB. It is therefore crucial for buyers
to ensure the suﬃcient level of competition in e-RA. Data
indicated that some types of tenders face the problem of low
number of bidders or even insuﬃcient number of bidders
(with NOB � 1). Based on these ﬁndings, the need for ex-
post analysis of completed e-RA data arises. Ex-post analysis
should focus on variables that have been the subject of
interest of this research and that can help us to understand
the bidding strategy and willingness of suppliers to partic-
ipate in tenders. In particular, these variables cover CHA for
each bid made in e-RA, the diﬀerence between the initial bid
and the ﬁnal bid for each bidder and their possible relation to
TOC and attractiveness of the contract that can be measured
in terms of BBA. Unfortunately, such detailed data assigned
to individual bidders were not at disposal for this stage of
research.
Buyers should investigate, which suppliers are highly
competitive, what kinds of TOC are attractive for them and
also how the high contract value is appealing to each of them.
-ese ﬁndings support the suggestion of Tka´cˇ et al. to pay
attention to the volume of contract as it is the most sig-
niﬁcant reason why construction companies decline to bid
[29]. Estimating investment costs is the ﬁrst and crucial cost
estimate related to the planned construction activity [63].
Application of e-RA can therefore be encouraged in such
market segments where suﬃcient competition exists, and
there is evidence that contractors are willing to compete with
their bids.
-e appropriate timing of the tender in relation to the
seasonality of works and capacity utilization of construction
companies may be a signiﬁcant driver for achieving positive
e-RA outcomes. -e target number should be adequately
stratiﬁed according to the diﬀerent types of tenders; as for
the BUI subset, it is more crucial to invite especially highly
interested bidders rather than to focus just on high number
of bidders. Figure 4 also indicates that the eﬀort to achieve a
higher number of bidders is justiﬁed for the COM subset. In
this case, data suggest that the higher the number of bidders
in e-RA, the greater the achieved savings that can be rea-
sonably expected. As no strong association of BBA and other
variables has been detected, there is no need to search for a
suitable minimum threshold of ﬁnancial volume of tenders
to be suﬃciently attractive for contractors.
Finally, the Slovak practice has shown that public au-
thorities mostly prefer the lowest bid price despite the fact
that e-RA supports multicriteria evaluation of bids. -e
focus on ﬁnancial savings seems to be logical if other tender
parameters are ﬁxed and not subject to bid evaluation (such
as quality, duration of warranty, and duration of works).
However, it is economically justiﬁed to use multicriteria in
many cases, so public authorities should consider changing
their approach and paying more attention not just to life-
cycle costs but also to other aspects such as limitation of the
use of detour routes during roadworks. -e need to change
the approach to multicriteria evaluation also comes from the
Directive 2014/24/EU on public procurement [9], supports
achieving objectives of sustainability in public procurement
(performance criteria should be linked to the life cycle and
the sustainability of the production process of works).
-e studied area (Slovakia) belongs together with other
three Central European States (the Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, and Poland) to the Visegra´d Group (V4). Taking into
consideration that V4 countries have undergone the same
process since 1989 (democratic establishment, economic
transformation, and accession to the European Union),
ﬁndings presented in this paper are valuable for purchasing
Table 6: Contingency table for the evaluation method used in e-RA
auctions stratiﬁed by the type of contracts.
Evaluation method Lowest bid price (%) Multicriteria (%)
BUI 69 (98.6) 1 (1.4)
COM 33 (91.7) 3 (8.3)
OTH 17 (77.3) 5 (22.7)
PRM 30 (90.9) 3 (9.1)
Total 149 (92.5) 12 (7.5)
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practitioners within the whole V4 area. Moreover, the in-
ternational impact of this research also covers other Central
European countries (e.g., Slovenia) and Southeast European
countries (e.g., Croatia) that have undergone the similar
process as V4 and that have adopted the option of e-RA use
within public procurement.
5. Conclusions and Research Implications
-is paper has addressed the use of e-RA in relation to
construction tenders in Slovakia by performing an empirical
analysis of real auction data. More speciﬁcally, the issues
concerning competition in auctions and preferred evalua-
tion method were examined; predictive variables and the
corresponding statistical model for the amount of relative
saving were selected. -e ﬁndings presented in this paper
aim to contribute to a more informed decision on e-RA
application in procurement practice relating to the con-
struction sector and result in both theoretical and mana-
gerial implications.
From the theoretical perspective, this research con-
tributes to the limited body of knowledge in the area of
construction auctions by providing detailed empirical in-
sight of the real data on completed public tenders. In par-
ticular, this paper extends the literature by examining
relationships of selected e-RA variables with the motivation
to contribute to the better understanding of the construction
e-RA’s nature and buyers’ expectations relating to the po-
tential ﬁnancial beneﬁt of the e-RA use. -ese theoretical
ﬁndings can be applied within the theory of IT adoption,
e.g., when examining technology acceptance model [64] for
the purpose of construction auctions adoption.
-e ﬁndings presented in the previous sections have also
revealed several remarkable managerial implications in the
area of construction procurement. -e ability to approxi-
mately evaluate the potential of ARS is important as this
might be another important factor for purchasing managers
regarding the decision to adopt e-RA, as the use of e-RA is
not free of charge. -e data presented in this paper may also
help us to provide improved prediction of investment costs
with regard to the potential savings achieved from the ex-
pected value of the contract. From this point of view, more
accurate estimation of achievable savings through e-RA
could support investors’ decision-making.
5.1. Limitations of the Paper and Future Research
Considerations. -is research is not without its limitations.
Firstly, the size of the sample did not allow a separate
correlation analysis for individual subject types of tenders. If
this was possible, the results would certainly contribute to a
deeper understanding of the eﬀects of this categorical var-
iable on e-RA variables. Secondly, the examination of the
evaluation method used in e-RA has also been limited due to
missing data on evaluation criteria other than price and their
weights. However, with regard to the percentage of the
multicriteria evaluation in the sample, these data will not be
signiﬁcant from a statistical perspective and thus will have
only an indicative value. And thirdly, the data presented in
this paper refer to the Slovak practice. It can be expected
that, in other countries, the relationship between the same
variables could be of a diﬀerent nature or strength. Future
comparative studies on the topic of e-RA in the construction
sector may bring further interesting insights on a trans-
national scale.
Future research should focus on a more detailed analysis
of e-RA variables from the perspective of the type of the
tender. More speciﬁcally, it would be desirable to use a
greater number of data to determine the recommended
minimum number of bidders for individual types of con-
tracts, such as buildings, transportation, maintenance of
roads, maintenance of facilities, and construction project
services, or other services related to construction. Fur-
thermore, such analysis should also take into account the
ﬂuctuations in economic activity over the business cycle.
Another direction of further research may also examine
the attractiveness of tenders in terms of their ﬁnancial
volume. Together with the type of the tender, the expected
volume of the tender also plays an important role because
with a higher expected value, a tender becomes more at-
tractive for prospective contractors. Accordingly, the es-
tablishment of the threshold below which e-RA tenders are
not attractive for suppliers anymore would also be beneﬁcial
for construction procurement practice.
As this research does not address postauction data,
further research should also focus on cost overruns after the
execution of construction works based on the ﬁnal invoice.
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